StarKist

• Risk across the industry, not a finding about this company: fishing fleets and processing plants have some of the worst documented forced labour, including trafficked crews held at sea for years.
• Owns or runs its own production
• Relies on fish and seafood from fishing boats and farms, where crews and farm workers, often migrants recruited into debt, have been held for months or years, beaten and denied pay, out of reach of factory audits. It hasn't shown any steps to trace its fish and seafood to the boat or farm or have the conditions of the people who catch or farm it checked, so it's graded Lacks transparency until it does.

Research notes StarKist cans tuna at its own plants in Pago Pago, American Samoa (a US territory not on the country list, so not shown) and Guayaquil, Ecuador. In 2020-21 it bought 98% of its tuna straight from vessels, all its purse-seine tuna from ISSF-listed vessels and about 7% from MSC-certified fisheries, but it publishes no vessel list. Parent Dongwon runs about 42 vessels. Its labour measures are a supplier code, signed anti-slavery certifications from major suppliers, Seafood Task Force membership and announced third-party audits of some suppliers, none shown to check crews. About half of the 313 vessels in its supply chain are Taiwan-owned or flagged, largely crewed by Indonesian migrants.